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This thesis compares the Army, Navy, and Air Force
technology base programs for the purpose of identifying
features of the Navy and Air Force programs that might
benefit the Army. This study also examines three technology
base issues to assess how well the Army's program responds to
their concerns. As a result of these efforts, four
recommendations are proposed to improve the Army's technology
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For the last four decades the United States and its
allies have developed national security policies predicated
upon a credible nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence of the
Warsaw Pact. These have been based on the realization that
only through qualitative superiority would we be able to
deter or defeat the numerically superior threat. During
World War II, this country developed a unique process capable
of providing its troops with the best equipment that could be
made available. The process was and is predicated upon the
availability of innovative basic research that is applied to
the development of sophisticated fielded weapons systems.
However, many in Congress and within the science and
technology (S&T) community feel that we are losing our
capability to ensure the availability of technology
innovations to draw upon. One recent report states that:
... Over the last twenty years, we have seen a gradual
weakening of this process. Imperceptible at first and so
gradual that the seriousness of the change is only barely
apparent now... We are seeing a steady erosion of the
commitment to qualitative superiority. [Ref. l:p. 1]
As an indication of the severity of the situation, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense is currently conducting two
studies. One is to identify ways to consolidate or
restructure the Department of Defense (DOD) laboratories and
research centers, and the other is to identify ways to
similarly restructure the test and evaluation facilities
[Ref. 2:p. 4]. This is no small undertaking as the Pentagon
spends about $7.9 billion a year on a network of
approximately 72 laboratories and research centers. An
additional $7.9 billion is spent on military ranges and test
facilities. [Ref. 3:p. 1)
DOD identifies those research efforts which lead to the
development of specific military capabilities as its
technology base program. The technology base can be viewed
as the front-end investment in the acquisition process and
encompasses work prior to a deployment decision [Ref. l:p.
17]. The technology base is further subdivided into three
activities: basic research (category 6.1), exploratory
development (category 6.2), and advanced exploratory
development (category 6.3).1 The technology base is often
obscured by the larger funding category, Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), of which it is
part.
For instance, during the Carter-Reagan defense buildup,
RDT&E funding increased nearly 100 percent. Many mistakenly
believe that the technology base portion of RDT&E enjoyed a
1 DOD budget categories for research, exploratory
development, and advanced exploratory development are 6.1,
6.2, and 6.3 respectively. These terms are used
interchangeably throughout this thesis.
2
commensurate resource infusion. This is not so. When one
discounts Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) funding, science
and technology (S&T) activity levels have remained
essentially unchanged for the past twenty years. The
technology base clearly did rot benefit from the expansion
that the other RDT&E elements experienced in the late 1970's
and early 1980's.[Ref. 4:pp. 34-35]
The deteriorating state of our technology base extends
beyond the issue of inadequate funding. In recent years,
numerous studies and reports have been generated on this
issue. No unanimous conclusions or prescriptive solutions
have been forthcoming. However, the researchers are in
agreement that the topic is worthy of continued
investigation.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
This project was initiated when the Chief of the Concepts
and Analysis Branch in the Army's Laboratory Command (LABCOM)
expressed interest in how funds are allocated to the various
technology base programs. This interest lay in questions
such as these: How many resources should be devoted to
research vice exploratory development or advanced exploratory
development? From an even larger perspective, what portion
of the Army's RDT&E budget should be allocated to the
technology base? In fact, should this funding represent a
3
fixed percentage, a total dollar amount, or should it vary
from year to year on the basis of some discrete determinants?
Such questions, however important, are beyond the scope
of this thesis. Instead, the central issue of this research
is to determine how the other services manage their
technology base investments. For instance, do they attempt
to fund their S&T efforts at a predetermined level? How do
they prioritize resource distribution among the three
elements of the technology base? How does their management
organization differ from the Army's? Essentially, this
research examines Navy and Air Force technology base programs
for features that could benefit the Army while also
identifying technology base issues of importance to
influential groups external to the Army - Congress, OSD, the
Administration, and industry. The goal is that these issues,
once identified, can be acted upon to enhance the success and
effectiveness of the Army's technology base strategy.
The Army has developed a technology base strategy for the
distribution of its technology base resources. This strategy
proposes that 50 percent of the technology base be allocated
to the development of next-generation and future systems.
Twenty-five percent is targeted at developing emerging
technologies. Fifteen percent is earmarked for systemic or
chronic problems and ten percent is reserved for maintenance
of the technology base infrastructure. When interviewed,
numerous LABCOM personnel indicated a belief that this
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distribution of technology base funds evolved over time and,
when the Army promulgated its technology base investment
strategy, this practice was endorsed because it conveniently
explained what the Army had been doing. Furthermore, it was
anticipated that the Army would continue to fund its
technology base in roughly these same proportions.
This strategy is not necessarily incorrect or inadequate.
It may have evolved precisely because it distributes
resources optimally to the various elements of the technology
base. The primary objective of this thesis is to compare the
Army's technology base program, management structure, and
resource allocation practices with those of the Navy and the
Air Force. A second objective of this thesis is to identify
three pervasive concerns expressed by major stakeholders such
as Congress, the Administration, and those within the DOD S&T
community. While many concerns about the technology base are
pervasive, not all are relevant to this thesis. Moreover,
there is not time to discuss all of them.
Selection criteria were developed to determine which
issues should be examined. It was determined that the issues
should be pervasive, relate to the basic issue of technology
base resource allocation, and reflect concerns over which the
Army could independently exercise a considerable degree of
control. The following three issues meet these criteria and
will be examined in this study:
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" The trend of decreased funding for technology base
programs. This trend underscores the belief that we are
compromising future capabilities for present systems
acquisitions.
" The perception that technology base managers are risk
averse.
* The debate on the best way to ensure continued technical
innovation. Should the selection process emphasize
objectives to be attained (requirements pull) or should
basic research and exploratory development be conducted
without objective in the realization that some
breakthroughs will inevitably occur (technology push)?
The purpose is to examine these concerns and relate them to
the Army's technology base program and investment strategy.
Recommendations on possible courses of action to address
these issues will be proposed.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Research questions were developed to facilitate specific
recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the Army's
management of its technology base. The research questions
are as follows:
* How does the Army's management of its technology base
compare with those of the Navy and Air Force in terms
of...
- its management structure?
- its relative priority for funding 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3A
programs?
- the philosophy of its investment strategy?
" Can the Army benefit from the adoption of certain
features of the other services' technology base
investment strategies?
* How well does the Army's technology base management and
investment strategy address the pervasive issues
6
identified? More specifically, what can the Army do to
overcome deficiencies posed by these issues?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research method involved examination of the
technology base programs conducted by the Army, the Navy, and
the Air Force. Emphasis was placed upon their management
structures, prioritization of the budget categories within
the programs, and philosophies of their investment
strategies. Data on the services' programs was obtained
through an extensive literature review and interviews with
individuals in the Army's LABCOMM and the Navy's Office of
Naval Research (ONR) and Office of Naval Technology (ONT).
The research method also involved an extensive literature
review of current and recent studies pertinent to DOD's
technology base program. These were invaluable in selecting,
identifying and researching the three issues, mentioned
previously, which will be discussed in this thesis. These
issues are:
" The trend of decreased funding for technology base
programs.
" The perception that technology base managers are risk
averse.
" The debate on the best way to ensure continued technical
innovation.
E. SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of this thesis is limited to issues about the
allocation of resources to and within the technology base.
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The scope is further limited to those issues over which the
Army can independently exercise control. For instance, there
is considerable concern within Congress and the S&T community
that DOD's technology base management organization lacks the
capability to coordinate the activities of the various S&T
performers (i.e., the Services, DARPA, etc.)
Most of the available studies and literature generalize
about the technology base from an overall DOD or national
perspective. They do not specifically address the Army's
conduct or management of its technology base. Yet, because
the services autonomously pursue their own technology base
objectives with independent organizations for the execution
and management of these pursuits, the assumption has been
made that the three chosen issues have distinctive
implications for each of these organizations as well.
Criteria for selection of the issues examined in this thesis
were chosen in part to ensure that this assumption was valid.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This thesis is composed of five chapters. The first
chapter has provided an introduction. The second chapter
provides background information about the technology base in
general and how program guidance is developed and promulgated
at the OSD level. Information in this chapter is essential
to an understanding of later chapters. The third chapter
examines how the three services conduct their S&T programs.
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Comparisons are made between the Army's program and those of
the Navy and Air Force. The fourth chapter discusses three
issues relevant to the Army's technology base. The fifth
chapter provides conclusions and recommendations resulting
from this research.
II. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
A. GENERAL
This chapter provides background information on the
process, structure, and strategy of DOD's S&T program. This
information is essential to an understanding of material in
the following chapters. Included in this chapter are an
overview and discussion of the following:
* Funding categories within DOD's RDT&E program.
" Composition of the programs that comprise each of the S&T
budget categories.
" DOD S&T oversight and management organization.
" DOD technology base investment strategy.
• Agencies that contribute to the management and
implementation of DOD's S&T effort.
B. BUDGET CATEGORIES
Within DOD, funding for all Research, Development, Test,
and Evaluation (RDT&E) is reported in six budget
subcategories. These categories are numbered from 6.1 to
6.6. The definitions of these categories follow:
6.1 Research - Includes scientific study and
experimentation directed toward increasing knowledge and
understanding in those fields of the physical, engineering,
environmental, biological, medical, and behavioral-social
sciences related to long-term national security needs. It
provides fundamental knowledge for the solution of military
problems. It also provides part of the base for subsequent
exploratory and advanced development in defense related
technologies and of new or improved military functional
capabilities in various scientific fields.
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6.2 Exploratory Development - Includes all the efforts
directed towards the solution of specific military
problems, short of major development projects. This type
of effort may vary from fairly fundamental applied research
to quite sophisticated breadboard hardware2, study
programming efforts.
6-3 Advanced Development - Includes all projects which
have moved into the development of hardware for
experimental or operational test. It is characterized by
line item projects, and program control is exercised on a
project basis. The focus of Advanced Exploratory
Development (6.3A) lies in the design of items being
directed toward hardware for testing of operational
feasibility, as opposed to items designed and engineered
for eventual Service use.
6.4 Engineering Development - Includes all those
development programs being engineered for Service use but
which have not yet been approved for procurement or
operation.
6.5 Management Suport - Includes research and
development effort directed toward support of installations
or operations required for general research and development
use. Included would be test ranges, military construction,
maintenance support of laboratories, operations and
maintenance of test aircraft and ships, and studies and
analysis in support of the R&D program. Cost of the
laboratory personnel, either in-house or contract-operated,
would be assigned to appropriate projects or as line items
in the Research Exploratory Development, or Advanced
Development Program areas, as appropriate. Military
construction costs directly related to a major development
program will be included in the appropriate element.
6.6 Operational Systems Development - Includes research
and development effort directed toward development,
engineering, and test of systems, support programs,
vehicles and weapons that have been approved for production
and Service employment. 6.6 is not an official category as
are 6.1-6.5, but is a term used for convenience in
reference and discussion. Thus, no program element will
exist numbered 6.6. [Ref. 5:pp. 2-7]
2 Breadboard hardware is a term used to identify an
experimental model or a prototype.
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DOD has historically defined its S&T program as
consisting of funding categories 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3A.
However, the technology base was defined as consisting of
categories 6.1 and 6.2 only. In recent years, these
definitions have been used interchangeably. Throughout this
thesis, the two terms are used interchangeably and include
the 6.3A category.
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY BASE PROGRAM
1. Research (6.1)
The Armed Forces have supported research since the
early days of the nation. For example, the Army funded the
Lewis and Clark expedition in 1804. Before the National
Science Foundation and the National Aeronautics and Science
Administration, DOD supported most of the nation's basic
research. In the 1950's and early 1960's, DOD supported
about 80 percent of the federally funded research. Today,
DOD supports about 66 percent of the federal research, but
only 13 percent of the basic research. (Ref. 4:pp. 55-561
In FY89, DOD spent approximately $956 million on
research. As Table 1 indicates, the Navy was the largest
single contributor at $352 million. The Army and Air Force
supported $171 million and $197 million respectively. DARPA
and the Defense Agencies sponsored the remaining $236 million
basic research effort. [Ref. 6 :p. 15]
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The Pentagon views basic research as a crucial source
of future technology. Unlike other programs, research is not
necessarily expected to result in a military application.
It is just as important to identify and terminate the
failures (and perhaps learn from those lessons) as it is to
recognize and expedite the successes. [Ref. 7:p. 8]
Thus, research is selected on its scientific merit and its
potential for future application to the DOD mission. Lewis
contends that it is sometimes necessary to force technologies
TABLE 1. DOD FY89 FUNDING OF TECHNOLOGY BASE PROGRAMS
(millions $)
Air Defense
Army Nay Force DARPA Agencis Total
Research (6.1) $171 $352 $197 $88 $148 $956
Exploratory
Development (6.2) $571 $430 $588 $624 $309 $2522
Advanced
Technology
Development(6.3A) $415 S190 $758 $557 $179 $2099
Total Services and







Source: Compiled from data provided by the Office of the CNO
and from Planning, Managing, and Funding DOD's
Technology Base Programs, Davey, Michael E., May
1989.
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"even if we conclude that the pursuit of a given technology
will pay no dividends.. .so that we can assess the military
implications of that technology should the enemy choose to
exploit it." [Ref. 8:p. 1]
DOD supports research initiatives in such diverse
fields of science as these: [Ref. 4:p. 56]
* physics * behavioral sciences
" astronomy 0 radiation sciences
* electronics 9 terrestrial sciences
* mathematics a atmospheric sciences
• materials * computer science
* oceanography 0 energy conversion
" chemistry * aeronautical sciences
* astrophysics 0 medical and biological sciences
Research (6.1) is composed of three program elements
(PE's). They are the Defense Research Sciences (DRS), the
University Research Initiative (URI), and In-House Laboratory
Independent Research (ILIR).
DRS is the largest PE with funding approaching $800
million. Universities receive about half of the DRS funds
via a competitive process. Primary emphasis of the
university research is on single investigator efforts, in
which a single professor is assisted by a small group of
postdoctoral scholars and graduate students. DRS efforts
generally focus on a single scientific discipline and the
average award is about $100 thousand, a figure that varies
14
from discipline to discipline. DRS supports about 4000
scholars in 285 institutions in all 50 states and the
District of Columbia. Projects are funded from three to five
years, with approximately 1000 projects awarded each year.
[Ref. 9:pp. 4-5]
The URI PE also supports university research.
However, the emphasis of the URI program is on research
conducted by multidisciplinary teams. About 85 percent of
URI funds support research conducted by multidisciplinary
teams. The remainder supports graduate fellowship programs
and faculty development programs. About 1000 graduate
students participate. The URI projects are funded for three
years. [Ref. 9:pp. 7-11]
URI and DRS projects are selected on the basis of
merit competition. Each year, the Services and the Defense
agencies advertise through the Commerce Business Daily and in
brochures put out by each of the agencies, called Broad
Agency Announcements, or BAA's. Proposals are evaluated on
the basis of scientific or technical merit and the potential
relevance to the DOD mission. The relevance requirement is
statutory and is a consequence of the Mansfield Amendment,
enacted in 1970. [Ref. 9:pp. 11-12)
The third PE within the 6.1 category is ILIR. The
Navy actually has two types of ILIR. One is Independent
Research and it is a 6.1 PE. The other is Independent
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Exploratory Development (IED) and it is a function of the 6.2
budget category. [Ref. 10:p. 3]
ILIR provides flexibility to the Laboratory Directors.
ILIR projects are conducted in the service labs and do not
require pre-approval like most other research endeavors.
Instead, reports on the ILIR fund usage is provided at the
end of the year. All the services supported ILIR in FY90 and
in the FY91 budget requests.
Besides being their main source of discretionary funds,
ILIR helps maintain an atmosphere of creativity and
research excellence, provides seed money which can lead to
new research efforts, which enhance the labs' S&T bases,
and most importantly assists the laboratory directors in
hiring new researchers ... The Defense Science Board stated
that "A successful laboratory requires discretionary basic
research funding for its long-term vitality." The DSB
recommended that at least five percent and up to ten
percent of the annual funding of Feder' -aboratories
should consist of ILIR funds. (Ref. 5:p. 30]
DRS accounts for approximately 90 percent of the 6.1
budget. ILIR supports about 6 percent of DOD's research
budget and the remaining 4 percent is devoted to the URI
programs. [Ref. 4:p. 57]
2. Exploratory Development (6.2)
Basic research (6.1) that shows promise and potential
for military application is advanced to exploratory
development. Exploratory development encompasses all
efforts, short of major development, directed toward the
solution of specific military problems. These efforts vary
from fundamental applied research to development of
sophisticated breadboard hardware.
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This category of research is composed of multiple
PE's, with each service's programs composed of a unique set
of PE's. For instance, the Navy has 14 PE's keyed to Naval
warfare mission areas. (Ref. 11:p. 19]
3. Advanced Technology Development (6.3A)
Advanced technology development, or advanced
exploratory development, is intended to assist the services
in transferring the most promising new technologies into
weapons systems in a timely manner. DOD's 6.3A program
attempts to facilitate this transfer by funding the building
and testing of "breadboard" prototypes that, while
inexpensive and quickly assembled, still provide adequate
assessment and feasibility of the military application of a
new technology. Prototyping of this sort has two inherent
benefits.
" It speeds introduction of new technology into fielded
systems.
" It provides better information on likely cost performance
and development schedules, allowing for better decisions
on which weapons should enter full-scale development.
[Ref. 12:p. 22]
D. THE DOD TECHNOLOGY BASE ORGANIZATION
1. Military Reform Act of 1986
The Military Reform Act of 1986, often referred to as
the Goldwater-Nichols Act, abolished the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and
replaced it with the Under Secretary of Defense for
17
Acquisition (USD(A)). It also recreated the Office of the
Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E).
The purpose of this act was to provide a separation of
those responsible for research and development from those
responsible for production decisions. The intention was to
ensure that weapons transferred from the laboratory to the
factory had attained an acceptable level of technological
maturity. [Ref. 13:p. 613] Both the President's Private
Sector Survey on Cost Control (known as the Grace Commission)
and the Packard Commission had criticized the combination of
research with production [Ref. 4:p. 61]. Ironically, the
Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government
concluded that
... these changes reflected a need to strengthen the 'back
end' of the weapons acquisition process, including
engineering development, manufacturing, contracting, and
industrial-base management. But this emphasis on the back
end, while necessary and desirable, has weakened the 'front
end' of the process, consisting of research, technology
generation, and tentative exploration of military
applications. [Ref. 12:p. 20]
DOD was reorganized as a result of this legislation
and is now configured as depicted in Figure 1. [Ref. 6:p. 17)
2. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
(USD(A)) has oversight responsibility of the technology base
programs undertaken by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA), the services and the other defense agencies.





















Director, Defense for Director, Advanced
Defense Research and Defense Research
Science Board Advanced Nuclear Agency Projects Agency
Technology (DARPA)
DUSD (R&AT)
Figure 1. Organization of DOD Technology Base Management
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3. Director, Defense Research and Engineering
As indicated in Figure 1, the Director, Defense
Nuclear Agency, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense,
Research and Advanced Technology [DUSD (R&AT)], the Director
of the Defense Science Board, and the Director of the Defense
Advanced Projects Agency all report to the Director, Defense
Research and Engineering (DDR&E). The DDR&E is responsible
for ensuring that the technology base programs of the three
services and the Defense agencies comply with OSD's
technology base guidance. The DDR&E also acts as mediator in
disagreements over technology base responsibilities and
priorities in order to ensure they are settled so that DOD's
technology objectives are upheld. According to USD(A), the
DDR&E has five primary responsibilities. They are to oversee
* Development and acquisition of weapon systems through
full scale engineering development.
" Force modernization.
* Design and engineering.
" Developmental test and evaluation.
* Basic research, exploratory development and advanced
technology development. (Ref. 14:p. 31]
4. DUSD for Research and Advanced Technology
The DUSD (R&AT) is the services' point of contact for
technology base programs. He reports to the DDR&E. The DUSD
(R&AT) is responsible for
* Writing the portion of the Defense Guidance applicable to
the services' technology base programs.
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" Reviewing the services' two-year budget proposals.
* Responding to the services' Program Objectives Memoranda.
* Working continuously with the services to achieve mutual
science and technology interests.
* Ensuring the services' technology base programs establish
new research initiatives to meet long term requirements.
[Ref. 14:p. 32]
Z. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT STRATEGY
1. Overview
The Science and Technology Investment Strategy was
introduced this year to satisfy Congressional requests that
the Critical Technologies Plan be presented in the context of
an overall S&T strategy. This document describes the S&T
effort in terms of 14 functional/mission areas and 17
technology areas.
The investment strategy provides a strategic focus
derived from the National Military Strategy, and the Defense
Planning Guidance. The plan considers the effects of
changing security, economic, and technical environments.
Furthermore, it provides twelve long-term goals stated in
terms of necessary military requirements 15-20 years in the
future. Approximately 200 technology objectives support
these goals. The twelve goals, listed in Table 2, are
divided into three categories: Deterrence, Military
Superiority, and Affordability. [Ref. 15:pp. 2-4]
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TABLE 2. MAJOR LONG-TERM GOALS OF THE INVESTMENT STRATEGY
DETERRENCE
Goal 1. Weapon systems that can locate, identify, track,
and target strategically relocatable targets.
Goal 2. Worldwide, all-weather force projection capability
to conduct limited warfare operations (including
special operations forces and low intensity
conflict) without the requirement for main
operating bases, including a rapid deployment force
that is logistically independent for 30 days.
Goal 3. Defense against ballistic missiles of all ranges
through non-nuclear methods and in compliance with
all existing treaties.
MILITARY SUPERIORITY
Goal 4. Affordable, on-demand launch and orbit transfer
capabilities for space-deployed assets with robust,
survivable command and control links.
Goal 5. Substantial antisubmarine warfare advantages the
United States enjoyed until recent years.
Goal 6. Worldwide, instantaneous, secure, survivable, and
robust command, control, communications, and
intelligence (C31) capabilities within 20 years, to
include: (a) on-demand surveillance of selected
geographical areas; (b) real-time information
transfer to command and control authority; and (c)
responsive, secure communications from decision
makers for operational implementation.
Goal 7. Weapon systems and platforms that deny enemy
targeting and allow penetration of enemy defenses
by taking full advantage of signature management
and electronic warfare.
Goal 8. Enhanced, affordable close combat and air defense
systems to overmatch threat systems.
Goal 9. Affordable "brilliant weapons" which can
autonomously acquire, classify, track, and destroy
a broad spectrum of targets (hard fixed, hard
mobile, communications nodes, etc.).
AFFORDABILITY
Goal 10. Operations and support resource requirements
reduced by 50 percent without impairing combat
capability.
Goal 11. Manpower requirements reduced for a given military
capability by 10 percent or more by 2010.
Goal 12. Enhanced affordability, producibility, and
availability for future weapons systems.
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2. Critical Technologies Plan
The Critical Technologies Plan lists the 20
technologies considered the most important weapons-related
technologies. These were chosen on the basis of performance,
quality design, and multiple use criteria. Once selected,
the 20 technologies were prioritized into three groups, A, B,
and C. The A group consisted of those technologies that were
perceived as the most pervasive. The B group consisted of
enabling technologies, which offered the most immediate
advances in weapons systems capabilities. The C group is
composed of emerging technologies whose applications are in
the distant future and are most difficult to assess with any
certainty. Table 3 presents the 20 technologies, listed by
category. (Ref. 15:p. 71
F. THE PLANNING PROCESS
All of the services conduct annual top-down, bottom-up
planning processes to modify and update the five year Program
Objectives Memorandum. From the top, the services receive
direction from the Defense Planning Guidance. They also
receive guidance from the Critical Technologies Plan.
Planning begins with a review of the previous year's
activities. Inputs are also received from major commands as
to deficiencies which require action. The services then
decide on new research initiatives, programs to advance from
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TABLE 3. CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES
GROUP A:
" Composite Materials









" Machine Intelligence and Robotics
" Parallel Computer Architectures
" Sensitive Radars
" Signature Control
" Simulation and Modeling
* Weapon System Environment
GROUP C:
" Biotechnology Materials and Processes





one budget category to the next (i.e., 6.1 to 6.2), which
programs to continue, and which programs to terminate. [Ref.
4:p. 60]
G. THE DEFENSE ADVANCED PROJECTS AGENCY
The Defense Advanced Projects Agency was funded at $1269
million in 1989. DARPA was created in 1958 in response to
the Soviet Union's Sputnik program. President Eisenhower
felt that a different type of organization was needed because
revolutionary technology crosses traditional disciplinary and
organizational lines and is inherently of a high risk, high
pay-off nature.
DARPA was set up to be DOD's "corporate" research
organization capable of working at the "cutting edge" of
technology. DARPA's organization allows it to explore
innovative applications of new technologies where the risk
and payoff are both high, but where success may provide new
military options or applications--or revise traditional
roles and missions. In theory, since DARPA has no
operational military missions, it should be able to
maintain objectivity in pursuit of research ideas with
promise for quantum technology advancement. [Ref. 13:p. 73]
DARPA is known for its unique and unusual ways of doing
business. The agency has actively supported dual-use
technology. In recent years, one of its most visible, high-
profile dual-use endeavors has been its involvement with
Sematech 3 . DARPA provided one-half of the $I billion for this
consortium. [Ref. 16:p. 3]
3 Sematech is an industry-government R&D consortium to
restore U.S. competitiveness in semiconductor technology.
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Addressing the agency's unique business practices, Dr.
Fields, former Director of DARPA, testified to Congress that
one of the agency's intentions is to
... establish options for the Services in the defense
industrial base. Unless a new product, process or service
is available to the Department, our investments cannot have
an effect. That is not to say that we invest up to the
point of product introduction. Most commonly, we work with
industry to reduce technical risk with seed funds, usually
cost shared with companies, and then Service investment or
private capital carries on from there... But since our
focus is on defense industrial capability we form teams
among for-profit and not-for-profit organizations to
facilitate technology transition. In fact, since teaming
is an inherent part of DARPA's business practice, we find
nothing unusual in the support of consortia like SEMATECH,
the MCC, or the MIT/LL/IBM/ATT superconductivity
consortium. [Ref. 17:p. 4]
In FY90, Congress conferred an additional unconventional
authority upon DARP- -j invest $25 million a year over two
years in high tec'.,ology companies. DARPA can expect to
receive profits from these investments in much the same
manner as a venture capital firm. The $25 million a year is
designed as a revolving fund. If DARPA makes money, it may
reinvest it. The heart of the program is a streamlined
contracting process called "flexible agreements." The first
such agreement with Gazelle Microcircuits, Inc., a
manufacturer of gallium arsenide computer chips, was for $4
million and took only two weeks to negotiate. Normally, more
than a year is required to execute such contracts. [Ref.
18:pp. 25-26]
DARPA employs nearly 200 people, approximately half of
whom are scientists, to administer its $1 billion plus
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research budget. The agency does none of its own research;
instead, it contracts with outside parties. Within DOD,
DARPA has 52 joint programs supported by Memoranda of
Understanding. Approximately 30 percent of the programs are
conducted with each of the three services and 10 percent
with the other Defense agencies. [Ref. 17:p. 9] DARPA's
organization is tailored to its role and is frequently
modified to accommodate new projects. The agency consists
of the Director's office, two administrative offices and a
variable number of technical offices. [Ref. 14:p. 74]
DARPA's technology investment strategy is to "identify that
R&D which is so risky, so long term, so difficult for an
individual firm to appropriate for its own benefit, so
unlikely to generate sufficient profit and yet so important
to DOD that DARPA's investment is justified." [Ref. 17:p.
11]
H. STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ORGANIZATION
The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was
established in 1984, with the Director reporting directly to
the Secretary of Defense. The SDIO mission is to provide the
technological basis for determining the feasibility of
eliminating the threat to the U.S. and its allies posed by
ballistic missiles. [Ref. 6:p. 40] Like DARPA, SDIO does
none of its own research. Service laboratories and
contractors conduct most of the SDIO's research effort.
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The SDIO budget has grown from $1.1 billion in 1984 to
about $3.6 billion in 1989. The entire SDIO budget is funded
with 6.3A funds. There is little doubt that a portion of
SDIO's activity involves research and exploratory
development, but it is difficult to determine the
proportions. (Ref. 6:p. 48]
I. DEFENSE AGENCIES
The Defense agencies are the Defense Nuclear Agency; the
Defense Communications Agency, the National Security Agency,
the Defense Mapping Agency, and the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA). DARPA's contribution to the
technology base is larger than all of the other Defense
agencies combined. For this reason and due to its unique
mission relative the DOD technology base, DARPA was addressed
separately. The other Defense agencies provide funds for a
little more than 6.5 percent of DOD's entire technology base.
Their largest contribution is to the research program (6.1),
of which their share is about 15 percent.
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III. THE SERVICES' TECHNOLOGY BASE PROGRAMS
A. INTRODUCTION
Each of the services formulates its technology base
programs with overall guidance from OSD. This guidance takes
many forms including the Defense Planning Guide and specific
service guidance. However, each service independently
maintains an organizational structure for management and
oversight of its technology base.
This chapter describes the different management
structures used by the three services. It also discusses the
relative importance of the various elements (6.1, 6.2, and
6.3A) of the technology base within each service. A
discussion of each technology base investment strategy is
also presented with emphasis on the different approaches the
services use to manage and formulate their technology base
investment strategies. The goal of this analysis is to
highlight differences and determine if certain aspects of
Navy and Air Force programs might benefit the Army.
B. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
1. General
The Air Force Chief of Staff has designated the
technology base program a "corporate investment" to increase
its visibility and to promote its priority for long-term
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stable funding. As a "corporate investment," the technology
base program is allocated a fixed fraction of the overall
budget. [Ref. 14:p. 3] When the program is reviewed, it is
assessed for balance and emphasis in light of all the program
elements4 that make up the program rather than on the basis of
each program element individually. The Air Force's goal is
to have the technology base comprise 2 percent of its total
obligational authority. Currently, the technology base is
classified as one of the Air Force's 35 executive programs.
This designation confers upon the technology base program the
stature and importance afforded other executive programs such
as the B-2 Bomber. [Ref. 4:p. 72]
2. Organization
The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition (ASAF(A)) reports to the Secretary of the Air
Force and is responsible for oversight of the Air Force's
entire RDT&E program. Within the ASAF(A) office, the
Director of Science and Technology (DS&T) is responsible for
oversight of the service's technology base programs. [Ref.
14:p. 51]
In October 1987, the Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Technology and Plans (DCS T&P) was established
4The program element is the basic building block in DOD's
programming, planning, and budgeting system. Each program
element consists of all costs associated with a research
activity or weapon system.
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within the Air Force Systems Command to conduct day-to-day
operations and oversight of the Air Force technology base
program. The DCS T&P reports to the Chief of Staff of the
Air Force via the Commander, Air Force Systems Command. In
forming the DCS T&P, the offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Science and Technology and the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Plans and Programs were combined. The intent of the
consolidation was to improve communication and coordination
between those evaluating and planning new weapons systems and
those responsible for research and advanced technology
development for the new weapons systems. [Ref 16:p. 51] The
Air Force Systems Command R&D Organization is depicted in
Figure 2.
The DCS T&P establishes and oversees the Air Force
technology base programs, but these programs must be approved
by the DS&T, who ensures that the investment strategy is
well-balanced and meets both near and long-term requirements
of the Air Force technology users [Ref. 4:p. 72]. The Office
of DCS T&P is manned by approximately 70 professionals, and
consists of five major research directorates: Aircraft;
Strategic and Space; Combat Support; Armament and Weapons;
and Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. [Ref.
14:pp. 51-52].
The Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) is
responsible for planning, management, and oversight of the
Air Force's research (6.1) effort. In-House Laboratory
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Figure 2. Air Force Systems Command R&D Organization
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Independent Research (ILIR) funds are directly distributed to
and managed by the individual laboratory directors. However,
AFOSR retains oversight responsibility. The Commander of
theAFOSR reports to the DCS T&P, who is responsible for
ensuring the integration of 6.1 research with the 6.2 and
6.3A programs. The AFOSR conducts a program of research
contracts and grants, oversees the research programs of the
Air Force labs, and manages three subordinate units. The
three subordinate units are the European Office of Aerospace
Research and Development in London, the Air Force Office of
Scientific Research, Far East located in Tokyo, and the Frank
J. Seiler Research Laboratory in Colorado Springs. The
London and Tokyo units gather information about international
research and acts as liaison between the Air Force and
foreign researchers. The Seiler Research Laboratory performs
basic research in-house. [Ref. 14:pp. 53-543
3. Air Force 6.21 Program
The AFOSR is responsible for management and oversight
of the Air Force research (6.1) program. Its mission is to:
0 Conduct and support programs in areas that support the
Air Force mission.
* Maintain leadership in those research areas most vital to
Air Force interests.
* Assure continued quality and excellence in basic
research.
* Prevent technological surprise and guarantee
technological availability.
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* Transfer successful research efforts to the Air Force
laboratories and commands. [Ref. 19]
In FY90, the Air Force AFOSR received $213.6 million
to conduct its mission. Of this amount, the Air Force
allocated $189 million for the Defense Research Sciences
program element and it was used to fund research in six major
disciplines. Another $24.6 million was suballocated by DOD
to fund the University Research Initiative program and 61.6
percent of these funds ($15 million) were devoted to
multidisciplinary research. The other University Research
Initiative funds were distributed to the Summer Faculty
Research Program, the Research Initiation Program, the
Laboratory Graduate Fellowship Program, and the National
Defense Science and Engineering Graduate Fellowship Program.
[Ref. 19]
Universities conduct the bulk of the Air Force's
research activities. In FY90, 60 percent of AFOSR's research
funds supported university research. The remaining funds
went to industry (20 percent), ILIR (15 percent), and 5
percent were for maintenance of the AFOSR infrastructure. In
FY90, Air Force research (6.1) received slightly more than 13
percent of the total technology base allocation. [Ref. 19]
4. Air Force 6.2 and 6.3A Programs
The Air Force DCS T&P provides oversight for the
service's 6.1 and 6.2 programs. However, it takes an
especially active role in the direction of the Air Force
Advanced Technology Development (ATD) program. The Air Force
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Systems Command has five major product divisions. They are
the Electronic Systems Division, the Armament Division, the
Human Systems Division, the Aeronautical Systems Division,
and the Space Division. Since 1980, each of these divisions
has been assigned responsibility for one or more of the 14
Air Force laboratories which perform activities primarily in
support of that division's mission. Similarly, each of the
research directorates within DCS T&P works closely with a
specific product division and has oversight and coordination
responsibility for that division's laboratories. [Ref. 4:p.
74]
The individual laboratory director is confronted with
a chain of command which dictates dual reporting
requirements. He reports to both the parent product division
and his responsible DCS T&P research directorate. This does
not mean that the laboratories work exclusively for a single
product division or a single research directorate. The
interdisciplinary nature of 6.2 and 6.3A necessarily requires
the laboratory directors to manage programs for a number of
product divisions. [Ref. 4:p. 74]
The Air Force rationale for placing laboratories under
the control of product divisions is to facilitate
communication between the developers and the ultimate users,
claiming that this arrangement improves long range technology
base investment planning. With the assertion that this
arrangement provides for a more timely transition of mature
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technologies into fielded weapons systems, the Air Force
believes this arrangement reduces both costs and development
time. [Ref. 4:p. 75!
Air Force emphasis on 6.3A programs is demonstrated by
their growth in nominal dollars from $159 million in FY75 to
$758 million in FY89 [Ref. 4:p. 75]. Advanced exploratory
development accounted for 49 percent of the total technology
base program in FY89. In FY90 only $639 million was
committed to the 6.3A program. This represents 46 percent of
the total technology base funds. Most of this activity is
performed by defense industries through contracts
administered by the product division laboratories. The Air
Force contends that contractor participation in the
successful development and testing of new technology results
in more rapid contractor incorporation of technological
advances. [Ref. 16:pp. 58-59]
The Air Force also supports the largest exploratory
rcsea-ch (6.2) effort in absolute terms despite the fact that
it allocates a smaller proportion of its technology base to
this budget category than the other services. It allocates
about 41 percent of its technology base resources to 6.2
programs and in FY90 this amounted to $566 million.
5. Air Force Investment Strategy
The Air Force Technology Base Investment Strategy is
characterized by the following observations:
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" The entire technology base program is treated as a
"corporate investment." When budgets are examined, the
program is viewed as a whole for proper balance and
emphasis.
" The goal is to fund the technology base program at two
percent of Air Force total obligational authority.
" The technology base program is classified as an executive
Air Force program. This designation institutionalizes
the program's stature and criticality.
" The technology base program emphasizes technology
transition. This explains why nearly 50 percent of the
technology base funds are used for 6.3A programs. [Ref.
4:p. 72]
Like the other services, the Air Force conducts an
iterative annual top-down, bottom-up planning and review
exercise. It augments this process with insights gained from
Project Forecast II. The purpose of Forecast II was to
identify potential technologies that could "change the nature
and design of future systems, while concomitantly improving
the Air Force's warfighting capabilities." (Ref. 14:p. 59]
This project was established by the Secretary of the Air
Force and chaired by the Commander of Air Force Systems
Command. Approximately 175 military and civilian experts
from various commands participated. Forty technological
initiatives were identified for technology base funding
support. Research progress in each of these areas is
monitored and changes in emphasis are made as the
technologies mature. The purpose of this ongoing planning
activity is to prevent technological surprise and to remain
alert to new technological opportunities. [Ref. 14:p. 59]
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C. DEPARTMENT O1 TRE NAVY
1. Organization
Figure 3 depicts the Navy's technology base
organization. The Chief of Naval Research is the scientific
advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant
of the Marine Corps. He reports to the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition. The
Office of Chief of Naval Research is composed of the Office
of Naval Research (ONR), the Office of Naval Technology
(ONT), and the newly created Office of Advanced Technology
(OAT). [Ref. 22] Since 1985, the Chief of Naval Research has
also had oversight responsibility for all of the Navy's
laboratories [Ref. 4:p. 64].
ONR funds, manages, and oversees the Navy's basic
research effort. ONR is composed of four research
directorates: Mathematics and Physical Sciences,
Environmental Sciences, Engineering, and Life Sciences. A
fifth directorate, the Applied Research and Technology
Directorate, is responsible "for adapting and extending basic
research toward applied research, thereby helping to
transition research results into the Navy's exploratory
development program." [Ref. 4:p. 67] The Navy is the only
service with a research directorate that performs this
activity. ONR also supports, supervises and oversees four
Navy labs: the Naval Research Laboratory, the National
38
Secretary of the Navy
Assistant Secretary





Development, and Chief of Naval
Requirements Research
(OP-091) I
IOffice of O fice of 1 Off ce of
Naval Naval Advanced
Research Technology Technology
Figure 3. Navy Organization for Science and Technology
39
Oceanographic Research and Development Activity, the
Institute for Naval Oceanography, and the Navy Environmental
Prediction Research Facility [Ref. 4:p. 66].
ONT funds, manages and oversees the Navy's exploratory
development activities. ONT was created in 1980 "to provide
for a more clearly defined process of planning, execution and
transition of programs within the technology base and into
advanced technology development." [Ref. 14:p. 42] ONT
consists of six major directorates: Antiair/Antisurface
Warfare and Surface/Aerospace Technology Directorate;
Antisubmarine Warfare and Undersea Technology Directorate;
Support Technologies Directorate; Low Observables
Directorate; Ocean Science and Technology Directorate; and
the Industry Independent R&D Directorate. About 80 percent
of the Navy's 6.2 program is funded through the first three
directorates. The other three directorates are primarily
tasked with oversight and coordination of related 6.2
programs. [Ref. 14:p. 45]
The Navy is the only service that manages its 6.3A
program separately from its 6.1 and 6.2 programs. The 6.3A
program is managed by the Director, Research, Development and
Requirements (Test and Evaluation), who is also referred to
as OP-091. He resides within the office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Systems and
Engineering.and is also responsible for the conduct of day-
to-day 6.3A operations. [Ref. 4:p. 70]
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2. Navy 6.1 Program
ONR supports a much larger research program than the
other services. According to the proposed FY91 budget
submissions, the Navy will fund 41 percent of DOD's basic
research effort. Moreover, the Navy POM calls for continued
real growth in the 6.1 program through FY97. [Ref. 21]
The Navy's research program supports theoretical and
experimental research in fields such as physical and
mathematical sciences, engineering sciences, life sciences,
and ocean sciences. Funds are allocated among 16 science
disciplines and are cross-referenced to 17 warfare areas.
Universities conduct 53 percent of the Navy's research.
Other research performers include ONR laboratories (22
percent), other Navy laboratories (12 percent), and industry
(13 percent). [Ref. 21]
The Navy's laboratories perform much more of their
research in-house than those of the other services. Many
Navy laboratories not only have the capability to perform in-
house research and exploratory development, but can also
"carry a design almost to the production level through the
more 'mature' stages of advanced systems development (6.3B)
and engineering development (6.4)." (Ref. 4:p. 88]
ONR supports a larger ILIR program than the other
services. In FY91, the Navy proposes to fund its ILIR
program at $26.8 million. This represents nearly seven
percent of the entire 6.1 budget. DRS will receive another
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$374.4 million bringing the total Navy 6.1 program to $401.2
million. The Navy also expects DOD to allocate $24.0 million
to its University Research Initiative program. [Ref. 21]
3. Navy 6.2 Program
The Navy's exploratory development program is managed
by the Office of Naval Technology (ONT) within OCNR. ONT is
responsible for activities such as program planning,
approval, funding, review and evaluation. [Ref. 14:p. 43]
The Navy currently supports the smallest exploratory
development program of the three services. However, the
Navy's 1992 POM calls for real increases in funding for
exploratory development through FY97. According to the POM,
funding would approach $600 million in FY97. [Ref. 20]
Like its research program, the Navy performs a much
larger portion of its 6.2 program in-house than the other
services. In FY90, the Navy performed 47 percent of its 6.2
program in its own laboratories and another 4 percent was
conducted by other government agencies. Other performers
were defense contractors (42 percent) and universities (8
percent). [Ref. 20]
ONT sponsors an Independent Exploratory Development
(IED) program, which is similar in nature and purpose to the
6.1 In-House Laboratory Independent Laboratory funding
element. The major distinction is that IED is supported with
6.2 funds and is used to support 6.2 activities. In the FY91
budget submission, IED is funded at 3 percent of the 6.2
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budget and provides the technical directors of the Navy R&D
Centers with discretionary funds to support activities to
achieve their centers' assigned missions. [Ref. 11:p. 12]
"Normally, a specific program cannot be supported with
Independent Exploratory Development Funding for more than
three years." [Ref. 4:p. 70)
4. Navy 6.3A Program
In its FY91 budget submission, the Navy requested
$201.9 million for execution of its advanced exploratory
development program (6.3A). This is less than one third of
the Air Force's request and less than 40 percent of the
Army's proposed 6.3A funding level.
Day-to-day oversight of the 6.3A program is conducted
by OP-091. In August of 1990, the Chief of Naval Research
established the Office of Advanced Technology in compliance
with the approved Defense Management Report Navy
Implementation Plan of 1 October 1989. However, the function
and mission of this organization are yet to be determined.
[Ref. 22]
The Navy's advanced exploratory development program is
comprised of advanced technology demonstrations (ATD's) which
account for about 25 percent of the 6.3A program and advanced
technology development programs which account for the other
75 percent of the program. According to OP-091, Navy policy
requires full funding of each approved ATD. When cuts must
be made, vertical cuts will be enforced in reverse priority
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order. Each ATD project is managed by a single Systems
Command and the program sponsor cannot transfer funds from an
ATD project for use as an offset in another program. The
duration of ATD's is from one to three years.
5. Navy Investment Strategy
ONR, ONT, and OP-091 independently promulgate 6.1,
6.2, and 6.3A investment strategies respectively. They are
very similar in many respects and the relevant points of each
are presented below.
a. The Navy 6.1 Investment Strategy
The Navy research investment strategy seeks to
support the fleet of 2020 by
" Maintaining a broad, versatile program in all science
areas of potential naval relevance in order to create
and/or exploit scientific breakthroughs and respond to
critical fleet needs.
* Emphasize investments in ocean sciences, advanced
materials, and information sciences to accelerate
technology transition in high Navy priority areas.
" Investing 60 percent of funding in evolutionary
research, 15 percent in high risk/high payoff
revolutionary effort, and 25 percent in research closely
associated with fleet applications.
" Providing stable, predictable support to sponsored
investigators.. .and nurturing a strong and responsive
in-house laboratory research capability.
" Leveraging non-Navy R&D programs to optimize scarce 6.1N
resources.
" Accelerating transitions to meet critical scientific
gaps in essential fleet programs. [Ref. 21]
ONR has a policy of broad, flexible resource
allocation across diverse science disciplines and warfare
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areas. It also believes that certain sciences can be
projected to be important to given needs, and specific
investments are made for the purpose of bridging gaps between
Navy requirements and existing technology. [Ref. 25]
ONR believes a prudent investment strategy
requires provisions to accommodate the cyclic nature of
funding. "ONR addresses this by dealing with short-term
funding excursions through the external programs, and
maintaining long-term stability in the Navy laboratories."
[Ref. 23] With this approach, ONR retains flexibility and
maintains a strong in-house capability vital to Navy
interests.
b. The Navy 6.2 Investment Strategy
The Office of Naval Technology's goal is to
provide the Navy and Marine Corps with "new and improved
fleet capabilities in the most cost-effective and timely
manner." [Ref. ll:p. 9] This goal is achieved by developing
technology to
" Keep ahead of the projected threat.
* Provide affordable system options.
" Reduce fleet operating costs.
" Avoid technological surprise. [Ref. ll:p. 9]
In more specific terms, the corporate investment
strategy for the DON 6.2 Program is to:
* Ensure that, within available resources, the technology
needs for each naval warfare area are met, balancing the
portfolio over short-, mid-, and long-term needs,
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generally emphasizing weapons and surveillance
technologies, and their related countermeasures and
environmental support factors.
- Reflect Navy's commitment to ASW as its number-one
priority in the 6.2 investment posture.
- Consider other-service investments in areas of common
interest.
" Provide moderate, sustained support for platform
technologies that meet unique Navy and/or Marine Corps
needs.
- Consider DARPA investments in submarine technology.
- Consider Air Force, industry investments in aerospace
technologies.
* Provide stable, sustained support for mission support
areas, such as personnel/training, logistics, biomedical,
naval oceanography, environmental protection and
chemical/biological (CB) defense, with additional
targeted investment in selected high-payoff areas.
- Coordinate investment with other services in areas of
common interest, e.g., biomedical and CB defense.
* Ensure a stable technology base in core technology areas
such as electronic devices, advanced materials, human
factors and computer technology, with special emphasis on
growing the latter based on a Navy-unique niche
investment strategy.
- Maintain present investment level in DOD critical
technologies (-30 percent).
* Rebuild/maintain the Independent Exploratory Development
(IED) Program at a level equal to 5 percent of the 6.2
funds managed by those laboratories participating in the
IED program. [Ref. ll:pp. 10-11]
c. The Navy 6.3A Investment Strategy
The Navy's 6.3A investment strategy calls for
" Increasing the ATD portion of the 6.3A account.
* Attaining significant real growth in ATDS, ASW, and
electric drive technology.
* Maintaining the baseline non-ATD 6.3A program.
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D. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
1. Organization
The Army technology base management organization is
displayed in Figure 4. The Deputy for Technology and
Assessment reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Research, Development and Acquisition and is responsible for
planning, developing, and executing research (6.1),
exploratory development (6.2), and advanced exploratory
development programs (6.3A) [Ref. 4:p. 76].
The Army technology base organization is much more
complicated and fragmented than those of the other services.
The program is administered by four functional organizations:
the Army Material Command (AMC), the Surgeon General of the
Army (SGA), the Army Corps of Engineers (COE), and the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER). These organizations
employ about 15,000 scientists and engineers. For oversight
purposes, the directors of these four commands report to the
the Deputy for Technology and Assessment. [Ref 27:p. 8]
The Army Materiel Command receives 73 percent of all
technology base funding [Ref. 25] and is responsible for the
research, development, and acquisition of combat and support
equipment. AMC is analogous to the Air Force Systems Command
and is similarly composed of subordinate mission-specific
"buying" commands which run laboratories and technology base
programs. [Ref. 4:p. 221 The Army Laboratory Command
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(LABCOM) is also subordinate to AMC, but its purpose is to
"serve as the corporate center for acquisition of generic
science and technology in support of all AMC's commodity
commands." [Ref. 24:p. 8] LABCOM has seven laboratories that
employ about 1,800 scientists and engineers. In addition to
managing the research and technology programs of his own
laboratories, the LABCOM Commander is also responsible for
oversight of AMC's entire S&T program in his capacity as
Deputy Chief of Staff for Technology Planning and Management
for AMC. [Ref. 24:p. 8] The Army Research Office (ARO) also
reports to the LABCOM Commander. ARO serves as the Army's
major interface with the university community and manages
AMC's research (6.1) program.
2. Axmy 6.1 Program
The Army is the only service that manages its research
program from more than one office. Four major commands
receive 6.1 funds - TSG, AMC, COE, and DCSPER. Each of these
recipients has independent entities for management and
oversight of the funds allocated to it. According to the
FY91 budget submission, AMC will receive the largest portion,
approximately 70 percent of the basic research funds. TSG
will receive approximately 22 percent, COE 6 percent, and
DSCPER the remaining 2 percent. These percentages are
approximations and may fluctuate from year to year, but they
convey the general distribution of the Army's annual 6.1
allocation. (Ref. 25]
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The Army Research Office (ARO) is primarily
responsible for the management and oversight of AMC's
research program. It directly manages approximately half of
AMC's research allocation. The other half is managed by
AMC's laboratories and centers. Although ARO does not
directly manage the portion that goes to the labs and
centers, it does make recommendations to the Deputy for
Technology and Assessment regarding the size and content of
those programs and projects. [Ref. 4:p. 77]
The ARO staff consists of 121 people, of which 47 are
scientists or engineers [Ref. 25]. This staff sponsors a
program which consists of a mix of short and long-term
projects. ARO works closely with the Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and its schools to shape its
program according to mission area needs. (Ref. 4:p. 77]
Since 1982, ARO has supported Army Centers of
Excellence at selected colleges and universities. Research
in specific disciplines is funded frDm five to ten years.
Currently, these disciplines include electronics, rotary wing
technology, optics, mathematics, artificial intelligence,
high performance computing and photonics. [Ref. 25]
In FY91, the Army's technology base will be funded at
$1281 million. Of this, $189 million (15 percent) IS
dedicated to basic research. In the FY91 research (6.1)
budget request, DRS accounts for $180 million and the
remaining $9 million is allocated to the ILIR program. The
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Army also expects to receive an additional $22 million from
OSD for its University Research Initiative program. [Ref. 25]
In FY88 and FY89, the Army did not fund the In-House
Laboratory Independent Research program element. Funding
resumed in FY90 with an appropriation of $9.1 million. The
funds were distributed to AMC ($5.6 million), COE ($0.9
million) and TSG ($2.6 million). [Ref. 26:p. 1] In May 1989,
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development
and Acquisition directed that the ILIR program "will be
targeted at no less than 10 percent of the total 6.1 budget
to be attained by FY94 and maintained at or above that level
thereafter." [Ref. 26: 4] He also directed that "all ILIR
funds appropriated by Congress will be made available for
that purpose... ILIR funds will not be used to make up
deficiencies in planned mission programs." [Ref. 26:p. 4]
3. Army 6.2 Program
The Army's FY91 budget requested $580 million for its
6.2 activities (Table 4). This accounts for nearly 45
percent of the Army's technology base funds. As a proportion
of its total technology base resources, this is more than
either of the other services allocates to its exploratory
development program.
AMC's LABCOM retains responsibility for oversight and
management of the majority of the Army's 6.2 allocation.
However, the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is
largely responsible for the selection of specific projects
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and technologies which will receive funding. TRADOC uses a
procedure known as Concepts Based Requirements System (CBRS).
This procedure is performed annually and is explained in the
following paragraphs [Ref. 27:pp. 6-8].
Each year TRADOC develops and promulgates a concept of
warfighting. Once approved, this concept is used by the
TRADOC schools and centers to prepare Mission Area Analyses
(MAA's) in each of the Army's 13 major mission areas. In
performing its MAA, each of the schools and centers compares
the warfighting requirements of the concept with their
current warfighting capabilities. The differences between
the requirements and the capabilities are categorized as
battlefield deficiencies. The output of each MAA is a
prioritized list of battlefield deficiencies.
TRADOC Headquarters compiles all of the MAA's and
assesses the deficiencies from a global perspective. It then
prepares a final prioritized list of all of the battlefield
deficiencies and publishes these deficiencies in the
Battlefield Development Plan (BDP). The BDP is the driver
for changes in doctrine, organization, training, and
materiel. Deficiencies become an AMC material development or
acquisition requirement only if they cannot be overcome by
changes in doctrine, organization, or training.
Within AMC, there are Mission Area Managers (MAM's)
who work closely with the TRADOC organization responsible for
the MAA. The MAM's are responsible for preparing Mission
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Area Material Plans (MAMP's) that are subjected to a series
of reviews to select work packages to appear in the
technology base. The BDP is the document that drives this
process. "The MAMP process provides AMC HQ with a global
view of the material requirements of the Army as well as a
better means to exercise judgements regarding the value of
specific technologies." [Ref. 27:p. 8]
4. Army 6.3A Program
In FY91, the Army intends to commit $512 million to
its advanced exploratory development (6.3A) program. This
represents 40 percent of the Army's total S&T program. Like
the 6.1 and 6.2 programs, this program does not receive
oversight and management from a single source. Advanced
exploratory development work is conducted by COE, AMC, TSG,
and DCSPER. However, the majority of the 6.3A effort is
conducted by AMC; and LABCOM's Technology Management and
Planning Directorate is responsible for its oversight and
management.
5. The Army Technology Base Investment Strategy
The Army Technology Rase Master Plan guides the Army's
technology base investment strategy. It describes a vision
for defining, developing and acquiring state of the art
technology to assure U.S. Army superiority in the event of
war. "It is a resource constrained action plan for assuring
that the U.S. Army is the most deployable force in the
world." (Ref. 28:p. 12]
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The Army Technologv Base Master Plan is built on a
framework of principles that establish threat assessment,
technological forecasts, user requirements, resources and
specific science and technology objectives. The principles
of the plan are as follows:
* Ensure that the technology base program supports the
Army's future warfighting requirements.
" Balance the technology base between near-, mid-, and far-
term needs; between technology push and requirements
pull; and between weapons systems and other battlefield
requirements.
" Distribute technology base resources in accordance with
the Technology Base Investment Strategy: next-generation
and future systems, systemic issues, supporting
capabilities, and key emerging technologies.
0 Seize and retain the technology initiative.
" Enhance the return on investment of Army tech base
dollars by leveraging outside resources and by.conducting
joint and cooperative ventures with other services and
government agencies, our allies, industry, and academia.
* Reduce the time from system concept to successful
fielding through the conduct of focused Advanced
Technology Transition Demonstrations.
" Restore stability to technology base funding by assuring
a commitment to long-term goals.
* Provide top-down guidance to create an atmosphere that
fosters technology initiative and the pursuit of
promising, innovative opportunities. [Ref. 28:p. 12]
The Army technology base investment strategy
identifies four areas of investment: emerging technologies,
next generation and future systems, systemic issues and
supporting capabilities.
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The Army has determined that 50 percent of its
investments will be used to identify next generation and
future systems. The purpose of this investment is to speed
introduction of advanced technologies into new and improved
combat systems. This is accomplished by conducting Advanced
Technology Transition Demonstrations. These demonstrations
are the bridge between the user and the technology developer
and serve as "proof of principle" that technology is mature
enough to meet specific operational requirements and that the
risk of proceeding with development is acceptable. [Ref.
28:p. 7]
.... Next generation systems are usually defined as those
beyond the systems currently in engineering development,
while future systems are the ones a generation beyond that.
According to the Army, the difference between next
generation and future systems is less critical than the
fact that differentiating between relatively well defined
and more conceptual solutions to battlefield problems
provides a range of targets for technology base efforts
from mid-range (next five years) to long term (10-15
years). [Ref. 14:p. 68]
The second largest segment of the investment strategy
is emerging technologies. This receives 25 percent of the
technology base allocation. Emerging technologies represent
research efforts which tend to be non-system specific and
show great potential to enhance battlefield capabilities.
[Ref. 2 8 :pp. 2-3] Most of the emerging technology activities
are "focused on longer-term technology base activities,
exploring new technological concepts that could be used by
the Army 15-30 years in the future." [Ref. 14:p. 68] The 13
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emerging technologies that have been identified for special
emphasis are robotics, artificial intelligence, advanced
signal processing and computing, microelectronics, power
generation, armor protection, advanced materials,
biotechnology, neuroscience, low-observables, space
technology, directed energy technology, and advanced
propulsion [Ref. 28:p. 4].
The third area of emphasis is systemic or chronic
problems. This investment initiative receives 15 percent of
technology base funding and addresses issues such as
corrosion prevention and manufacturing problems. Solution of
systemic problems may not be as glamorous as developing new
systems, but the Army recognizes that it is essential to its
mission that they be addressed. [Ref. 14:p. 68]
The fourth investment area, supporting capabilities,
represents the Army's recognition that the R&D infrastructure
must have modern facilities and test equipment in order to
ensure continued leadership in battlefield innovations. Ten
percent of technology base funding is devoted to maintenance
and improvement of the research infrastructure. [Ref. 14:p.
68]
Since 1988, the Army has been using wargaming
exercises to "identify and select the most promising
technologies for investment, and to assess our future Tech
Base Investment Strategy and its relationship to the user's
vision for warfare in 2015." [Ref. 29] These exercises are
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called Tec.inology Base Seminar War Games. The most recent
war game was held in April and June 1990 and consisted of two
phases. The first phase had two objectives. One was to
identify the most promising next generation and future
systems from among those conceptualized by the technology
community. The second was to conceptually identify
additional systems required to meet the threat of 2015.
The second phase of the Technology Base Seminar War
Game assessed the operational impact of the next generation
and future systems which were selected in Phase One. "This
phase was designed to gain insights into the value and
implications of these systems in various operational
environments, and to illuminate NGS/FS technology attributes
and performance characteristics which provide the highest
degree of force effectiveness in a resource constrained
environment." [Ref. 29]
Pace and Moran point out a number of advantages of
technology gaming as a forecasting tool. Some of the
advantages are:
* It provides an opportunity for innovation normally
missing in the otherwise busy lives of R&D leaders.
" It is a valuable tool for developing consensus,
especially in terms of what the issues are or how the
problem should be stated.
" It can easily address questions and issues which are not
well defined because of its flexible and adaptive nature.
* It allows examination of command and control processes
when there is incomplete (and possibly erroneous)
information. (Ref. 30:pp. 243-44]
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Pace and Moran also concede that technology gaming has
its limitations. It is not useful for qualitative analysis.
Furthermore, it is not magic and requires considerable
resources to be effectively employed. However, they conclude
that technology gaming's advantages are so overwhelming that
it will eventually become an institutional part of the Navy's
R&D investment process also. [Ref. 30:p. 249]
E. SUMMARY
Table 4 presents FY90 and FY91 budget comparisons for the
three services. Of particular note is the fact that the Army
allocates a significantly larger portion of its RDT&E budget
to its technology base than does the Navy or the Air Force.
Table 5 provides a summary of the major features of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force technology base programs.
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TABLE 4. FY90-91 TECHNOLOGY BASE BUDGET COMPARISON ($M)
ARMY NAVYE~ li
TOTAL RnT9F
FY90 5418.7 13496.9 9465.8
FY91 6025.9 13276.3 9102.4
S&T INVESTMENT
FY90 1273.7 (23%)I 1394.5 (10%) 1020.3 (11%)
FY91 1280.7 (21%) 1427.7 (11%) 1069.4 (12%)
6.1 INVESTMENT
FY90 181.6 (14%)2 189.6 (14%) 361.0 (35%)
FY91 188.9 (15%) 201.5 (14%) 401.2 (37%)
6.2 INVESTMENT
FY90 547.8 (43%) 565.7 (41%) 443.5 (43%)
FY91 580.0 (45%) 580.1 (41%) 466.3 (44%)
6.3A INVESTMENT
FY90 544.3 (43%) 639.2 (45%) 215.8 (22%)
FY91 511.8 (40%) 646.1 (45%) 201.9 (19%)
1S&T investment as a percentage of total RDT&E.
2 1nvestment allocation as a percentage of S&T resources.
Source: Office of the CNO (OP-091)
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IV. TECHNOLOGY BASE ISSUES
In this chapter, three issues relevant to the technology
base will be examined. The issues are:
" The trend of decreased funding for technology base
programs.
* The perception that technology base managers are risk
averse.
• The debate on the best way to ensure continued technical
innovation.
Each issue will be discussed in the following sections.
A. TECHNOLOGY BASE FUNDING
Technology base funding has been a concern of many in the
last few years. As Table 6 indicates, technology base
funding, including SDI, increased 225 percent in constant
dollars between 1970 and 1989. During this same period,
RDT&E funding increased 169 percent. This gives the
erroneous impression that "front-end" investments received
much more emphasis than "back-end" initiatives during this
time.
As is the case in Table 6, SDI funding is often reported
separately from other 6.3A efforts. In recent years, SDI
accounted for about 40 percent of the technology base funding
and almost all of the increase in technology base funding
since 1984. However, "SDI is outside of the process that
controls the rest of DOD's technology base program." [Ref.
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TABLE 6. DOD TECHNOLOGY BASE FUNDING TRENDS (millions 1982$)
Total
Year 6.1 6.2 6.3A 1  SDIO 2  Without Total
SDI SDI
1970 779 2418 3197 NA
1971 728 2238 2966 NA
1972 712 2414 3126 NA
1973 629 2306 2935 NA
1974 579 2126 567 3273 NA
1975 530 1923 631 3084 NA
1976 528 1902 677 3107 NA
1977 556 1947 734 3237 NA
1978 576 1937 697 3210 NA
1979 608 1972 725 3306 NA
1980 653 2021 676 3350 NA
1981 6(0 2134 600 3393 NA
1982 6' 7 2233 738 3668 NA
1983 754 2357 792 3903 NA
1984 7"8 2051 1261 1109 4090 5199 24829
1985 760 2032 1175 1243 3967 5210 27371
1986 831 1984 1223 2318 4038 6356 29322
1987 756 1985 1433 3156 4174 7330 30464
1988 7,0 1924 1438 2957 4102 7059 30568
1989 755 1928 1658 2849 4342 7191 29663
1The 6.3A category was established in 1974.
2SDIO was established in 1984.
3Figures were not available for 1970-1983.
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4:p. 13] Moreover, many in the S&T community feel SDIO
efforts are not sufficiently general to be applicable to the
solution of a wide range of military requirements. Instead,
it is believed that SDIO efforts are aimed at solving
narrowly defined, specific SDI-related requirements. As a
result, "when SDI figures are included in DOD's S&T
activities, they present a distorted impression of budgetary
growth in the S&T programs." [Ref. 31:p. 48) Throughout the
remainder of this discussion, references to technology base
funding will not include that portion used to fund the SDI
program.
Basic research funding has been inconsistent over the
last 20 years. Research (6.1) spending declined from $779
million in 1970 and did not return to that level until 1986.
Moreover, since 1986, funding has declined 9 percent in
constant dollars.
Similarly, support for exploratory development declined
throughout the 1970's from its 1970 level. It then
rebounded, nearly returning to its 1970 level in 1983.
However, between 1983 and 1989, exploratory development
funding plummeted once again--about 18 percent in constant
dollars.
The budget category, advanced exploratory development
(6.3A), was created in 1974. Since that time, budgetary
support for this category has almost tripled. Since 1983,
all growth in DOD's technology base (excluding SDI) has
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occurred in the advanced exploratory development program as
indicated in Table 6.
Table 7 highlights the growth of the technology base
funding since the establishment of SDIO in 1984. During this
period, research (6.1) and exploratory development (6.2)
declined 3 percent and 6 percent, respectively, while overall
funding for RDT&E experienced 19 percent growth. During this
same period, advanced exploratory development without SDI
grew only 12 percent while funding for SDI increased 157
percent. As a result, many contend that the S&T program
suffered significantly at the expense of SDI. [Ref. 31:p. 56]
DOD faces a period that most believe will be
characterized by declining budgets. In this environment, the
technology base is particularly vulnerable for two reasons.
One is that more immediate procurement concerns tend to take
priority, and the other is that technology base programs tend
to have a faster spend-out rate than procurement programs.
These are explained further in the following paragraphs.
During periods of budget contraction, the services often
shift funds from their S&T programs to support more immediate
procurement requirements. This was recently demonstrated
when the Army cut its research (6.1) funding by almost one-
third and cancelled its In-House Laboratory Independent
Research program. Table 8 illustrates that the Army, like
the other services, supported increases in its research
program since FY80. However, when faced with budget
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TABLE 8. INDIVIDUAL SERVICE FUNDING FOR RESEARCH (6.1)
rArmy v i e
1980 130.7 214.9 119.2
1981 144.4 241.4 126.6
1982 179.2 276.5 147.4
1983 206.2 307.6 166.4
1984 216.5 320.6 191.4
1985 231.5 341.2 201.3
1986 250.3 342.3 210.2
1987 219.5 354.3 223.3
1988 168.9 342.1 197.7
1989 172.7 355.3 196.4
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense
constraints in FY87, the Army slashed its research program 12
percent; and in FY88 it reduced its research another 13
percent and eliminated its entire ILIR program.
...the connection between today's specific research
projects and future military products and technologies is
not obvious, cannot be quantified, and is extremely
difficult to render in explicit terms. As a result, while
everyone agrees that research is important, it is difficult
to make an argument that research funding should be
supplemented in any given appropriation. [Ref. 4:p. 35]
Conversely, it is far easier to grasp the implications of
cutting funds for hardware. A $100 million reduction in
procurement funds results in a visible and immediate
reduction in the number of tanks or aircraft. that can be
procured. This has led some to conclude that "while almost
everyone would advocate increased R&D funding in the
abstract, few are willing to trade more tangible programs for
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the vagaries of indefinite technological advances in the
future." (Ref. 4:p. 36]
The payout ratio for R&D appropriations is much faster
than those for procurement activities. When Congress
appropriates funds, the funds are available for disbursement
for varying periods depending on the type of activity being
funded. Technology base appropriations are generally
available for disbursement for a period of two years and
about 50 percent of the appropriation is usually disbursed in
the first year - hence a 50 percent payout ratio.
Alternatively, major procurement items are usually fully
funded, which means that appropriated funds are available for
disbursement as long as is necessary to build or develop the
item. For example, a $3 billion aircraft carrier takes ten
or more years to build. Once funds are appropriated for the
carrier, they are available for disbursement until the
carrier is completed and transferred to the Navy. However,
only a very small percentage of the appropriated funds are
disbursed in the first year ($150 million, for example).
When Congress, DOD and the services calculate budgets and
deficits, they are interested in disbursements, or outlays,
and not in appropriations. Therefore, in thir example, DOD
could realize a $150 million saving by reducing the
technology base appropriation by $300 million or by
eliminating plans for a carrier. (Ref. 4:p. 36]
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The Working Group on Technology contends that the trends
of declining technology base funding must be reversed. It
believes that funding must not only be increased, but it also
needs to be stable. Future savings in defense spending must
not come at the expense of the technology base effort. (Ref.
1:pp. 30-31]
The Working Group believes that funding must be increased
at the expense of force structure if necessary. It further
recommends that science and technology funding should grow at
a faster rate than the rate of total RDT&E funding. Should
RDT&E actually decline, it recommends that S&T should still
grow at a 5 percent pace. In either case, it recommends that
S&T funding should grow until it comprises 17 percent of
RDT&E or $7 billion FY89 dollars, whichever is larger.
Within the technology base, the Working Group recommends
the following allocations, where the larger of the two
suggested ceilings shouid govern. Funding for research (6.1)
should grow to $1 billion FY89 dollars or 3 percent of the
RDT&E budget, and exploratory development should increase to
$3 billion FY89 dollars or 7 percent of the RDT&E budget.
Advanced exploratory development (6.3A) should also be
increased to the same levels as those for exploratory
development (6.2). [Ref. 1:pp. 48-49]
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B. RISK AVERSE MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY
There are two reasons for the risk averse philosophy that
pervades DOD's technology base management. The first is that
the services are unwilling to undertake programs that do not
comply with their own view of their mission or doctrine. The
second is that the current philosophy minimizes the risk of
failure of any type. Each of these is discussed below.
The services have, on occasion, been unwilling to support
technological opportunities that did not coincide with their
traditional warfighting missions. Furthermore, "they are in
a position to discourage such initiatives." [Ref. 6:p. 24]
The services are extremely reluctant to support "orphan"
functions that are not central to a service's own
definition or fighting doctrine. This can present great
difficulties for setting well-balanced science and
technology priorities, since modern technology has provided
capabilities that may not coincide with traditional
approaches to mission accomplishment or the accepted
division of mission responsibility. [Ref. 6:p. 24]
As an example, the Army's fiber optic guided missile
program met with considerable opposition. The missile is
capable of hunting and engaging the enemy without exposing
the soldier to direct fire. Despite the advantage of
providing the soldier in the field with increased
survivability and lethality, it was resisted because it
conflicted with the Army's traditional "line of sight" combat
doctrine. [Ref. 6:p. 25]
The Unmanned Airborne Vehicle (UAV) is a program the Air
Force has been reluctant to support. It is known that the
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UAV can be an inexpensive platform for a variety of missions,
including surveillance, electronic warfare, target
acquisition, and weapon engagement. Yet, the Air Force
culture prefers piloted aircraft. Consequently, this
country's development of UAV's continues to lag. [Ref. 6:p.
25]
A final example is naval mine/countermine warfare. Many
experts contend mines could be an effective way of preventing
the Soviet fleet from departing the narrow passages from the
Black and Baltic Seas. Until recently, the Navy has not
afforded mine warfare a very high priority within the
technology base. This reluctance led a member of the Defense
Science Board to argue that
... the Navy has been ignoring mine warfare because "No one
can command a mine. You don't get promoted for procuring
them, there's no glamour to them." [Ref. 6:p. 25]
The Working Group on Technology views this situation a
little differently. It contends that management focuses on
research and development programs to meet current operational
requirements instead of anticipating future operational
problems and new operational concepts. [Ref. l:p. 231
The Working Group developed the conceptual device in
Figure 5 to illustrate their perception of the current
management philosophy with regard to technological innovation
and new operational concepts. In Figure 5, both operational
concepts and systems technology are divided into "current"
and "new" categories. [Ref. 1:pp. 24-25]
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Figure 5. Opera-ional Concepts and Systems/Technology
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The Working Group contends that most research and
development efforts occur in the lower left hand quadrant of
Figure 5 - current technology and current operations. It
states that
... most DOD development organizations tend to avoid risk
and, therefore, their RDT&E activities concentrate on
conservative projects that are the most likely to succeed
in the sense of meeting cost, schedule, and performance
specifications. They tend to operate in the area below the
dotted line in Figure 5. [Ref. l:p. 26]
The Group believes DOD should concentrate greater efforts
in the area above the dotted line in Figure 5, where new
operational concepts are integrated with new technology.
This area offers the highest payoff, but there is also a
higher risk of incurring failures in this region. [Ref. 1:p.
25]
The Working Group on Technology also asserts that
True innovation by its very nature, comes about after
repeated attempts and failures: however, current defense
management philosophy increasingly emphasizes an
intolerance of any failure. In turn, this risk averse
orientation provides a powerful and pervasive disincentive
to innovation. [Ref. l:p. 23]
This "failure avoidance" philosophy manifests itself in
the disproportionate concentration of technology base efforts
designed to solve near-term needs. "It is easier to gain
support for research activities that can be related to a
current specific military need." [Ref. 6:p. 48] An internal
OSD evaluation even concluded that many of DOD's research
(6.1) activities were "too well connected to current military
needs." [Ref. 1:p. 48]
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Short-term research tends to be less risky because it
tends to emphasize relatively mature technology with the
intent of making incremental, evolutionary advances. Long-
term projects are fraught with unknown and unpredictable
obstacles.
In summary,
...the philosophy of innovation must be injected again in
the entire acquisition process. Participants in the
acquisition process must be made aware that a premium is
being placed on innovative results. Failures arising from
ambitious goals are to be not only tolerated in research
and exploratory development, but also expected, because
repeated tries are a natural part of innovation. The
reward structures in the R&D and system acquisition
processes needs to be consonant with the premium placed on
innovative results. To attract the best talent, provisions
must be made for appropriate incentives, both for the
individuals and organization that participate in the
process. [Ref. l:pp. 31-32]
C. REQUIREMENTS PULL VERSUS TECHNOLOGY PUSH
There is concern that "requirements pull" and "technology
push" may be out of balance. Some argue that requirements to
prove relevance to military applications may be stifling
creativity. Others contend that "excessive loosening of ties
between research projects and military needs could lead to a
technology base program that produces little practical
benefit [Ref. 4:p. 11] This concern is addressed in the
following paragraphs.
First, is the question of how to best balance "technology
push" against "requirements pull." "Requirements pull"
refers to the process of organizing research programs such
that they are responsive to the user and the situation he
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will face on the battlefield. For example, if a battlefield
requirement dictates firepower with a designated range and
accuracy, technologies can be pursued to achieve that
purpose.
Advocates of "requirements pull" often cite the success
of NASA's Apollo Program. The President specified the goal
of putting a man on the moon within the decade, and
technologies were focused to achieve that objective.
Opponents of this approach contend that this achievement did
not come cheaply. Resources were diverted from other generic
research efforts, the results and benefits of which will
never be known. Opponents also cite SDI as an example. It
is still not clear whether SDI's objectives can be achieved,
but we have spent billions of research dollars pursuing them.
"Critics contend that requirements pull and relevance tests
dominate the planning process within the DOD science and
technology programs." [Ref. 4:p. 31] They believe that
"technology push" is more likely to provide quantum leaps in
technology, capable of changing the nature of warfare and the
way we think about it. They cite technological
accomplishments such as nuclear weapons and satellites.
These capabilities were not generated in response to specific
battlefield requirements. Instead, these dramatic
breakthroughs occurred by following new research ideas and
opportunities to their logical and technological limits.
High-energy lasers and railguns are SDI technologies that
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have been pursued because the physics and principles of the
proposed technology are understood. [Ref. 4:p. 32]
The task is to determine the best mix of both approaches.
Specific threats must be met, but new technological
opportunities must also be fully realized.
D. SUMMARY
It is imperative that the technology base is funded at
adequate levels. Furthermore, long-range planning must
emphasize stability in this funding. The technology base,
especially, 6.1 and 6.2, are inherently long-term in nature
and if this effort is to yield significant results it must
receive stable long-term funding.
DOD and the services must also emphasize and reward
innovation. However, this innovation needs to be encouraged
within the warfighting communities as well as in the
scientific community. Our greatest advances in warfare
technology will almost certainly result from the synergism
of new technology coupled with innovative concepts for its
implementation.
Lastly, there must be increased dialogue between those
responsible for research and the warfighters. Informative
exchanges will result in technology base priorities which
more closely approach an optimum balance between warfighting
requirements and research opportunities.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Army's technology base is extremely large and
complex. It would be very naive to believe that there are
simple solutions to the complex array of problems and issues
involved with it. There are no absolute answers. However,
the technology base organization and its mechanisms could be
modified to improve the efficiency of the process by which
technology base decisions are made. The following
modifications are recommended:
" Consolidate technology base management and oversight
activities in one office.
" Expand the In-House Laboratory Independent Research
Program to include provisions for 6.2 activities.
" Establish long-term funding floors for the technology
base and each of its components (6.1, 6.2, and 6.3A).
" Continue and expand use of technology gaming for the
purpose of formulating long-term investment priorities.
A. CONSOLIDATION
Currently, the Army's technology base efforts are managed
and overseen by four major subcommands - the Army Material
Command, the Surgeon General of the Army, the Army Corps of
Engineers and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. There
are two major disadvantages to the decentralized management
arrangement. They are explained in the following paragraphs.
First, the major subcommands that manage the technology
base programs are heavily influenced by the clients they
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serve. For instance, TRADOC is a key player in the Concepts
Based Requirements System which determines AMC's technology
research priorities. There is no doubt that the system
should be responsive to the user's need. However, there is a
possibility that this influence results in an overemphasis on
near-term evolutionary technology efforts to satisfy current
mission deficiencies.
The second disadvantage is that this decentralization
results in a lack of strong high-level support within the
Department of the Army. Because responsibility for
management and oversight is delegated to four subcommands,
the influence of these managers is diluted. The Army would
realize stronger and more effective technology base advocacy
if it consolidated its management activities in an
organization analogous to the Navy's Office of the Chief of
Naval Research.
AMC's Technology Planning and Management Directorate
(TPM) possesses the skills and personnel to fulfill this
role. This organization is such that it already performs
many of these duties. Further, the personnel that currently
manage and oversee the other three subcommands could augment
TPM. TPM should also be elevated organizationally to the
Department of the Army level and report directly to the
Deputy for Technology and Assessment. This would greatly
enhance the technology base program stature and would give
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its decision makers enhanced influence within the Army. This
would be especially useful for defending technology base
activities during budget cuts.
B. EXPANDED ILIR PROGRAM
The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research
Development and Acquisition has directed that In-House
Laboratory Independent Research (ILIR) program will account
for 10 percent of all 6.1 funds by 1994. This goal should be
achieved because this program fosters timely innovation,
encourages performance, and allows laboratory directors
additional flexibility.
It encourages timely inr.vation because ILIR projects do
not require prior approval and, therefore, bypass the normal
Army budget allocation process. It also provides an
incentive for enhanced performance because ILIR projects,
though not pre-approved, are reviewed annually. Laboratories
are awarded additional ILIR funds largely on the basis of
this review. Thus, laboratories have a powerful incentive to
use ILIR funds wisely. Lastly, the existence of ILIR funds
gives laboratory directors flexibility they would not have
otherwise. The only restriction on these funds is that they
be used for research (6.1) activities. Due to the way in
which the funds are awarded, there is little likelihood that
this discretion will result in wasteful pursuits.
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This study recommends that the Army establish a similar
program to support 6.2 activities in much the same way that
Navy's Independent Exploratory Development program does. The
benefits of the ILIR program - innovation, enhanced
performance, and flexibility - should be maximized. It is
recommended that a fixed portion of the 6.2 appropriation be
designated for this use, as in the 6.1 ILIR program.
C. STABLE LONG-TERM FUNDING FLOORS
It is vitally important to the Army that it establish
long-term technology base funding floors - a funding limit
which establishes the lowest acceptable level. The
Departrent of Defense, particularly the Army, is entering a
period that will most likely be characterized by budgetary
retrenchment. The Army will experience troop cuts and
procurement programs will be terminated. The leadership of
those divisions within the Army suffering reductions will
look elsewhere for funds. In 1987 and 1988, when they faced
a similar predicament, they turned to the 6.1 program. This
cannot be allowed to recur.
Technology base activities, especially research and
exploratory development, are activities that require
consistent long-term support if they are to be successful.
Cyclical funding patterns are detrimental to success.
Moreover, the cyclical history of technology base funding is
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not one that fluctuates between feast and famine, but rather
one that ranges from marginally adequate to inadequate.
There is no obvious answer as to what these floors should
be. The Working Group on Technology had some specific ideas
for DOD, but these are not necessarily appropriate for the
Army. It is important that the Army consider the issue and
establish what it believes are adequate funding level
targets. During prosperous periods, this target may be
increased. However, funding should not be permitted to fall
below this pre-established level. This consistency will
greatly enhance the success of those responsible for planning
the Army's technology base programs and priorities. It is
much easier to conduct long-term planning when an accurate
assessment of future resources is available.
D. INCREASED WARGAMING
One of the major obstacles to the introduction of
breakthrough warfighting technologies is the inability to
envision warfighting technologies outside of traditional
mission roles. Most groups develop "cultures," and they
identify with concepts that fall within the realm of those
cultural self-images. They reject those that do not. For
example, the infantry was reluctant to accept the FOG-M
because it was not a "line-of-sight" weapon.
Technology gaming provides an opportunity for both
researchers and soldiers to escape these traditional mindsets
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and think more openly about future warfighting opportunities
and requirements. Combining both researchers and warfighters
in these exercises has synergistic effects. The scientists
are able to develop a better idea of what the soldier of the
future will require and the soldiers are made aware of the
wide range of technology capabilities that may be available.
Both groups also develop greater respect and understanding
for what the other does and many informal communication
channels are opened.
Additionally, the gaming process provides technology base
planners with information to make decisions regarding the
proper balance between "technology push" and the need to meet
current requirements. Concurrently, warfighters gain a
greater appreciation for the important mission of the
technology base. The gaming process heightens their respect
for the facts that past technology base achievements are
responsible for current weapons' capabilities and that
current research efforts will, inevitably, provide enhanced
capabilities in the future.
It is recommended that every effort be made to continue
the Army's technology gaming effort. During periods of
declining budgets, exercises like technology gaming seem to
be the first activities to go. This should not happen.
Technology gaming is more important now than ever.
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Z. SUMMARY
It is unlikely that a methodology will ever be developed
to optimize technology base resource allocations. However,
these allocations have always been, and always will be,
developed by an organizational process which uses certain
procedures, or mechanisms, to arrive at allocation decisions.
By addressing organizational shortcomings and improving
mechanisms, more effective allocation decisions should
result. It is hoped that these proposals will promote frank
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